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General (Ret.) Eric K Shinseki*
Thank you for the kind and warm welcome. It is great to be here. Let me
pay my respects to these great youngsters in uniform here: Captain John
Porambo, Acting P.M.S., and his contingent from the Bulldog Battalion. Forty
years ago or so, I sat in formations like this one. It has been a wonderful
thirty-eight years for me serving in a great army, the best army in the world.
Let me congratulate the University of Georgia and Professor Loch Johnson.
Thank you very much for bringing together so many views and for this
opportunity to think about these difficult tasks. You have already recognized
Clete Johnson, but let me add my thanks to him and all the organizers for their
foresight and timeliness in choosing this topic.
Transitioning to democracy is hard work; we should know it in this country.
We have nearly 229 years invested in this process-the experiment continues
today. Looking at our democratic experiment today, going back to the original
principles and to our Founding Fathers, there is a lot that has endured, but
there have been significant changes as well. Democracy is inherently risky and
it is full of challenge. The autocrats out there who control power today are not
going to give it up willingly. How do you transition to democracy? How do
you democratize? Under these circumstances, legitimacy is a powerful tool.
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It is at least as powerful as military force. But you have to make your case for
it; then you must reinforce that argument very quickly by creating a safe,
secure environment within which you can begin to control and protect the
population. If you do not, there are many others who always seem to linger
around the fringes of crisis, who are looking for the opportunity to backfill
those vacuums and those voids. For those of us who have spent a little bit of
time wrestling with these responsibilities, we are always in a footrace to
control and protect the population. Two key words here: control and protect
the population before others step in to fill those voids.
It is a huge step, going from autocracy to democracy-I think all of us
would accept that. But I am also suggesting that it is another long step going
from a fledgling democracy to the sort of experiment that we enjoy today here
in America. Those of us who have spent some time in those troubled places
in the world: we believe in democratization; we believe it can work. We are
not frustrated or put off by it. It is important work. It is possible to get this
done and get it done in a way that all of us think is successful.
Let me try to add to the discussion this morning by talking about my
personal experiences in Bosnia. As I mentioned earlier today, in discussions
before coming to this stage, all of us are very good at describing problems. We
can tell you what is not working well; we can suggest to you that it is wrong-
headed. It is a lot harder to come up with suggestions for how to solve the
problem or to make things better. The reason I picked the Bosnia experience
to share with you is that it is a part of the world that has seen very little
freedom and a lot of suffering over the last 600 years. Yet, the models that
were put together there seem to have made some inroads against fear, against
domination, against oppression, and they certainly brought an end to
bloodshed.
I arrived in Sarajevo in July 1997 to assume command of SFOR, the peace
stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was a UN-mandated, NATO-led,
multi-national coalition.' At the same time I was doing this, I was asked to
handle two other commands, so I was really wearing three hats. The other two
commands were U.S. Army Europe, which is responsible for watching a
geographical area stretching from South Africa to the Baltics, and NATO Land
Forces Central Europe. Both of these headquarters were located in Heidelberg,
Germany. The third command, SFOR, was clearly the more challenging of the
three and I decided to base in Sarajevo. SFOR is a large multi-national effort.
See SFOR mission description, at http://www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm (last
updated Jan. 14, 2004).
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There are roughly forty troop-contributing nations: the nations of NATO
Russia (maybe the only time an American division commander has com-
manded a brigade of Russian soldiers); former East European nations; Baltic
nations; Turkey (a member of NATO); Malaysia; Egypt; and others. Thus, I
located myself in Bosnia to give the SFOR mission the priority of time, energy,
and focus that it deserved.
I arrived in Sarajevo July 10, 1997, a day when NATO attempted its first
PIFWC (Person Indicted For War Crimes) detention. This was the first
attempted PIFWC detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it did not turn out
well. It resulted in the death of the PIFWC, a Serb named Simo Drljaca, who
had been the police chief for the city of Prijedor, Republika Srpska. He
resisted detention, pulled out a weapon, and shot an SFOR soldier. In return,
he was killed in self-defense. His death generated charges by Serb hard-liners
that he had actually been captured, was laying on the ground, and was executed
by SFOR.2 As you might expect, we conducted an immediate autopsy using
Serb physicians to assure that the quality and the credibility of the autopsy
would be acceptable. The physicians agreed with SFOR's account, disproving
the charges. But the charge, nonetheless, started a sixty-day crisis of riots,
civil disturbances, and confrontations with SFOR, in large measure because we
were not as quick nor as effective at getting the truth out as the Serb propa-
ganda machine was at spreading disinformation. This was a year and a half
into the SFOR experience and we still had no control over the state-controlled
organs of propaganda, something that we would go to work on over the next
six months. We were in a violent crisis. The Drljaca episode was telling; the
resulting civil unrest and future PIFWC detentions would all be influenced by
this confrontation. It gave rise to significant concerns on the part of some in
NATO about the need for force protection of our soldiers. It led to a tightening
of the rules governing, notjust PIFWC detentions, but all operations generally,
and the result was an awkward statement of intent. It went something like this:
SFOR will not hunt down PIFWCs, but if in the course of its normal duties
SFOR encounters a PIFWC, and the tactical situation permits, SFOR may
detain the PIFWC for transfer to The Hague.
Describing rules of engagement for situations that never present themselves
is illogical and even our young soldiers see through them pretty quickly.
Detentions are inherently policing actions. In the absence of an effective
police force, it fell to SFOR to use its military capabilities to meet some
2 See, e.g., Law Projects Center Yugoslavia, at http://www.srpska-mreza.com/guest/LPC/
SimoDrljaca.html (providing an account of "The Murder of Simo Drijaca").
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widely-held expectations: expectations by The Hague that handed down these
indictments; expectations by Bosnians who had lost loved ones or who had,
themselves, suffered at the hands of the accused; and, certainly, expectations
by the international press, who sometimes encountered these indictees in
public, at eating places downtown.
Everyone expected action and bridging the gap between expectation and the
curious statement of intent was the commander's business. Commanders are
paid to figure out what has to be done and how. NATO always expected
SFOR to detain PIFWCs, but without repetitions of the Drljaca experience.
We put plans in place to conduct detentions with very high probabilities for
success and very low probabilities of injury, not only to innocents, but also to
officials in the performance of their duties. The last thing we needed to
happen in a detention operation was for a policeman to show up, have to
decide whether a detention or a kidnapping was in progress, and then decide
whether and how to get involved. That scenario is never helpful to anyone.
Thus, our planning included how to minimize those opportunities from
occurring: actionable intelligence, detailed and consistent rehearsals, patience,
and very clear and very simple rules governing the use of lethal force, so that
even our youngest soldiers could understand what was expected of them.
These items were key to our successes. Over time, we succeeded in becoming
pretty good at detentions, good enough so that some PIFWCs decided to turn
themselves in rather than wait for us to show up. Ideally, that is what is
supposed to happen. Someone being sought by the police should walk into the
police station saying, "Here I am."
In addition to the Drljaca incident, my first meeting with the Tri-Presidents
of Bosnia-Herzegovina gave me an indication of what the next fifteen months
were going to be like. The Tri-Presidents I am referring to here are President
Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim; President Momcilo Krajisnik, a Serb; and
President Kresimir Zubak, a Croat. After the customary initial introductions,
during which I outlined our objectives, they were very appreciative and I was
thanked profusely: "It's good to have SFOR here. Security is better, and we
are, in fact, better off. Our citizens can go about their own daily routines in
their own ethnic communities with great security." Then regrettably, the
meeting turned into a lecture: "When SFOR leaves, as it will someday, we will
go back to our old ways. We cannot help ourselves. It is our history; it is our
culture. We are three different peoples." I looked at these three gentlemen,
three European white males, who insisted that their cultures were so different
they could not possibly change the course of their history. You could barely
tell them apart, and without knowing their names, you could not be certain
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which was Croat, which was Muslim, and which was Serb-at least I could
not. They even spoke the same language! I thanked them for the history
lesson and then told them that I was probably the one wrong person in all of
SFOR to deliver that lecture to. I come from a country where nobody looks
alike, and most of us-not all, but most of us-arrive in this country with our
cultures, our languages, our foods, our dress, and our music. Somehow, in the
process of joining this great democratic experiment, we are able to find our
diversity positive and not threatening. So I chose not to buy their excuses for
slow-rolling SFOR's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Dayton Peace
Accords.
This encounter implied that I could not expect much help from them unless
whatever SFOR proposed would benefit them individually as well as benefit
their factions. We decided to press the initiative-and initiative is the key
word-in the sense of being proactive and not waiting for things to happen.
We decided to press the initiative because nothing changes in this part of the
world unless pressure is applied, subtle pressure, but pressure nonetheless.
The challenge was in being patient, not overreaching and creating a spike in
violence in response.
Everyone espoused cooperation as we sat around those long conference
tables talking about what was possible. There was, however, always an
undercurrent of backsliding and minimalism percolating just beneath the
surface. SFOR's responsibility was to aggressively pursue the safe and secure
environment within which the people-not the military, but those who really
do nation-building, reconstruction, and democratization, the great international
governmental and non-governmental organizations that bring their important
skills-can go to work. They could only do so if SFOR established and
sustained a secure environment that permitted them to get out of the cities and
in the countryside where the work was most needed. In the process, we hoped
to "isolate the battlefield," military terminology for separating bad actors from
the rest of the population, so we could then control and protect that population.
This would enable the other organizations, which can bring about real change
in democratization, to go about their duties. Although SFOR provided a level
of physical daily presence, its first choice was to apply force judiciously,
indirectly, and preferably as a last resort. Otherwise, the lesson to be gained
from SFOR's role in the mission would be that democratization requires a
large and powerful military with which to pressure the civil population to do
what was wanted: an unthinkable and unwise situation, and not the reason for
SFOR's involvement in this peacekeeping mission.
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While SFOR was conscious and deliberate in its application of force, its
successes in PIFWC detentions demonstrated that it was capable of bringing
to justice those who had been indicted. We were able to signal SFOR's
readiness and willingness to act decisively if reconstruction efforts were
stymied by obstructionism. In the town of Bijelina, a mother watched as
SFOR detained her son, a PIFWC, as he was departing their apartment building
for work. She was up on the third or fourth floor looking down as he exited
the building and stood next to his car. He was detained in a matter of seconds.
Her comment later to the press was that, "It was just like the movies, one
instant he was there and then he was gone. This SFOR, you have to watch
them." Comments like these added to SFOR's reputation.
SFOR worked at maintaining a strong partnership with the UN High
Representative, who reported to the NATO Secretary General and to the
Secretary General of the United Nations. As a result, he had the overall lead
for civil implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Our support for him was
essential. Others in the partnership included the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe; the UN Mission, Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Interna-
tional Police Task Force; the UN High Commission for Refugees; and others.
These were the Principals who sat in conference daily. We were all challenged
by ponderous organizations that had come together very quickly. Organizers
had put together as much capability as they could get, and none of us, not even
SFOR, had very clean structures. There were significant internal challenges
in each organization, and to coordinate amongst the international participants,
it took the leadership of the Principals to bring things together in successful
ways.
I lived with threats, both personal and those projected against American
soldiers. The occasional veiled message reminded that just eighteen dead
American soldiers would be enough to send SFOR home, a reference to our
Mogadishu experience. I was personally protected twenty-four hours a day by
the very best special operators in the world, but I went to bed every night
wondering whether tomorrow might be the day, not for an attempt on me, but
for a mass attack against our American contingent. We had no good
intelligence on the threats or how to preempt them, so we had to find ways of
generating our own intelligence. This is where the term "actionable intelli-
gence" applies. Intelligence was not forthcoming from our traditional combat
intelligence systems or processes, so we had to go on the offensive, seizing the
initiative on a broad range of activities from pure military tasks, including
intelligence collection, to infrastructure repair, to humanitarian assistance, to
focused engagements with the leadership of all three former warring
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factions-Muslim, Serb, Croat-at all levels, from national to municipal. This
is called "presence." These activities were designed to put our unknown and
unseen adversaries on their back foot, denying them the freedom to act. In
these situations, intelligence, legal, public affairs, psychological operations,
and civil affairs soldiers become tier one players; their contributions are
immense. Generating this kind of offensive action takes people, both in
numbers and with a wide range of skills and capabilities, to enable us to have
at least one more option than our adversaries. We were not always sure what
was working well or what worked best, but as we forced our adversary to react
to us, he began to show himself in very subtle ways, occasionally making
mistakes that we were prepared to exploit. Seizing the initiative developed the
opportunities that might not have otherwise presented themselves. Even with
the capability to exercise initiative, there are no guarantees of risk-free
operations, and commanders must accept and visualize what those risks might
mean. Personally accepting the risks that go with your decisions makes things
personal, and it becomes very personal. On a day when we ran one of our
riskier PIFWC detentions, a senior member of our Congress arrived just after
the detention operation had been successfully concluded. As I briefed him on
the operation, he reminded me that if the operation goes well, everyone will
take credit for it; if it goes badly, it would be quite lonely testifying before his
committee with the cameras of the nation rolling. I always thought things
might go that way, but having it explained so matter-of-factly made it just a
little bit colder than I expected.
I was not the first to command SFOR and in preparing for my duties, I
reviewed in detail the key lessons from each of my predecessors' tenures in
command. We noted that many of the commanders, both my predecessors and
the commanders below them, were tested soon after assuming command of
their organizations; within days in some cases, but certainly within months.
They were tested with what appeared to be manufactured crises that were laid
out as if to see how they would deal with them, to see if they had the right
stuff. On those occasions where a commander was able to deal with his crisis
effectively, that was the end of it. Where a commander did not bring together
all of the assets quite as effectively, there usually was a retest. I was
convinced that I was going to be tested early and I was determined to pass it.
My test occurred at the height of the Serb disobedience between July and
September 1997. As I indicated earlier, it was triggered by the death of former
Serb police chief Drljaca on July 10 and lasted until the municipal elections in
September 1997. Drljaca's death triggered an outbreak of civil disobedience
that spiked on August 20 when Serb hard-liners infiltrated special police loyal
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to them into Banja Luka, capital of the Serb Republic. We later concluded that
they intended to pressure the downfall of elected President Biljana Plavsic.
About five o'clock that afternoon, President Plavsic called, pleading for
SFOR's assistance.
We informed the Office of the High Representative, then assembled and
transported representatives of the international community to Banj a Luka for
a crisis action meeting with Madame Plavsic. She explained that she feared
for the safety of her supporters and demanded an immediate attack by SFOR
to recapture Banja Luka's police stations for return to her control. I explained
to her that nothing was ever that simple or that easy. We had her wishes and
would go to work on them.
We also had the responsibility of ensuring that SFOR did not appear to
have taken sides politically in what might have been internal Serb matters. So
we reconnoitered the city, confirmed the presence of large numbers of Serb
special police, and spent that night preparing orders and briefing and
rehearsing our forces. At dawn the next day, before most people were up,
when very few were on the streets, and with the infiltrators at varying stages
of alert, we conducted a very powerful, coordinated attack against the five Serb
police stations and took them down simultaneously. The action was over in
about twenty minutes. In the process of consolidating our gains, we confis-
cated over twelve tons of weapons, ammunition, and explosives and detained
special police officers from elsewhere in the Serb Republic who had infiltrated
those police stations.
During this action, we relearned lessons about physical courage from a
young Czech army captain. He was the first man into his assigned station with
his contingent in tow. As he entered the station, he encountered a phalanx of
armed special police, whose leader said, "I've lost members of my family in
the war. Today, one of us dies here, you or me." This young captain placed
his forearm across the chest of this special police commander, moved him
aside, and declared, "It is over." All resistance collapsed. The quality of the
leadership at company command level is important. Had this young captain
not acted decisively, we might still be there negotiating for that police station.
But in a few seconds, he solved the issue for us. There is no substitute for
courageous, decisive leadership at the company level, where it is most
important.
About a week later, on August28, Serb hard-liners, frustrated at their defeat
in Banj a Luka, sought to regain momentum and chose to make a stand in the
strategically important town of Brcko. For those who may not be familiar with
the geography of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska is shaped like an
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inverted L that has been tipped over. It runs south to north on the eastern
portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and then east to west across the top. The
politically sensitive town of Brcko is in the northeast comer, where the L
hinges together, strategically important because it unites the two regions of the
Serb Republic. At 4:30 a.m. on August 28, 1997 a siren sounded, calling Serbs
out of their homes. As they had rehearsed during the war, they assembled near
the town center and were directed to confront the sixteen-man U.S. infantry
platoon securing the Brcko Bridge near the center of town, our only crossing
over the Sava River and our land route to Europe. Its operational importance
led us to assign that platoon a mission to retain that bridge at all costs. By 5:00
a.m., the platoon and the south side of the bridge were completely surrounded,
and the crowd of rioting Serbs grew throughout the course of the day to several
thousand. The platoon was essentially cut off. The demonstration, which
began at 5:00 a.m., lasted until 9:00 p.m., when, on the instructions of a man
in a suit who had pulled up in a dark Mercedes, the crowd began to melt away.
In fifteen months in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I never encountered a spontane-
ous demonstration, although that term was used by the press to describe acts
of civil disobedience. Every event I am familiar with was orchestrated. For
sixteen hours, that infantry platoon was confronted by demonstrators who had
placed children and old women up against our concertina wire barricades with
the general populace to their rear. Directing the crowd's actions and
instigating confrontations with our soldiers were military-aged young men who
roved to the crowd's rear carrying cell phones and long wooden staves. On
occasion throughout the day, several young men would work their way forward
through the crowd and reach over the women and children to strike our soldiers
with the wooden staves. They had driven nails through the ends of the staves
and were using them to punish our soldiers with blows to their arms and
shoulders. The intent, we assumed, was to provoke a lethal incident.
Our soldiers stood their ground. The mission was to hold that bridge and
they did so. They did not overreact although they absorbed a lot of punishment
that day. When I visited them a day later, most could not raise their arms to
salute and could barely shake my hand. I thanked them for their courage and
their discipline. It was a great reminder-to me and to them--that there are
days when the best equipment in the world will not make a difference but
discipline, toughness, and character will.
A day later, on August 29, another U.S. infantry platoon on patrol
encountered and disarmed twenty-seven men moving up a trail in some woods.
They were questioned and released; very little was forthcoming about their
activities. Although the arms had been confiscated, the patrol leader, an
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inquisitive young lieutenant, wondered where the men had been headed. The
lieutenant followed that trail to the top of a mountain called Udrigovo, where
he discovered a nondescript, unimportant-looking tower sitting out in the
middle of nowhere. The tower turned out to be the key strategic communica-
tions site between Serb hard-liners in Republika Srpska and Milosevic in
Belgrade. The patrol deployed around that tower, took control over it, and
reported their actions. They were not quite sure what they had, they only knew
that twenty-seven armed men were headed towards it.
The judgment of this young officer, in seizing the initiative and following
his instincts, provided me with tremendous leverage in negotiating later with
Serb hard-liners-tremendous leverage. To get that tower back, the Serbs
were willing to grant the international community access to their state-
controlled radio and television networks so we could communicate directly
with the people. We leveraged for more, such as access to the networks for
moderate and minority candidates who were seeking public office in the
upcoming municipal elections on September 13 and 14. The importance of
this communications site to the Serb leadership was revealed through their own
strident demands for its return and their subsequent willingness to negotiate its
return in exchange for significant concessions towards democratization. Here,
we really began to learn how to negotiate and leverage. Apply pressure, stay
active, and when mistakes occur, be prepared to exploit.
Early morning about a week later, on September 8, a French reconnaissance
patrol in eastern Republika Srpska reported that passenger buses were being
loaded in one of the Serb hard-line strongholds. A quick check with other
patrols revealed that about fifty of these buses were being loaded in other hard-
line Serb communities with military-aged young men carrying long staves and
boxes of rocks-rocks which could be used as missiles in a violent confronta-
tion. The buses were headed west towards Banja Luka and a quick check
revealed that President Plavsic was holding her final campaign rally at a soccer
stadium in Banja Luka that night. We concluded that the hard-liners were
seeking a collision to challenge President Plavsic's leadership. Too strong a
move by SFOR to protect President Plavsic and her supporters might influence
the way Serbs in general saw her in the upcoming elections. SFOR had to
appear neutral in this confrontation, even as we administered the preservation
of a safe and secure environment.
From about 7:30 a.m., September 8, until the early morning hours of
September 9, the very capable multi-national U.S. division and the equally
capable multi-national British division proceeded to conduct, without the use
of lethal force, a classic military delay to slow this convoy of roughly fifty
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buses-slowing, diverting, and frustrating this Serb hard-liner effort. A
dropped tree across the road here, a pile of sand in the roadway there, a flat tire
or two; our object was to keep the convoy out of Banja Luka. Not a single bus
entered the city. They got close, but not a single bus entered Banja Luka. The
signs of our victory early the following morning were weary, hungry,
exhausted Serb demonstrators lined up at the bathrooms of the gas stations in
northeastern Srpska, waiting for the buses to be refueled because they had run
out of fuel.
Ironically, some Serb hard-line leaders, who had quietly pre-positioned
themselves in Banj a Luka in anticipation of this collision, and the likelihood
that Plavsic might capitulate, were discovered by Serb moderates who
threatened harsh retribution. They had pre-positioned themselves, we think,
to take control if President Plavsic stepped down. It fell to SFOR to escort
them safely out of Banja Luka because the moderate Serb population was
threatening their lives.
The value of physical strength and stamina, courage, and creativity on the
part of young leaders gave SFOR options it would not have otherwise had.
Young commanders executed so well that they provided me options that were
not forthcoming anywhere else. In the process, clear messages were sent to the
factions, to the Serbs as well as to the other two factions: SFOR is capable; it
is determined; it is a force to be reckoned with. I was never tested again. This
occurred early in my tenure as Commander of SFOR, but I was never tested in
this way again.
Peacekeeping is not an activity unto itself. It is one phase in a campaign of
activities to establish security and stability in troubled lands. It can occur early
in a crisis to try to avert a war; it can come after the fact, post-hostilities, after
attempts to avoid war have failed. Peacekeeping is merely one phase of a
broader campaign. The SFOR mission was a post-hostilities peacekeeping
mission following the three-year war from which the former warring
factions-Serb, Croat, and Muslim-all emerged exhausted but with some
ability to govern intact. No one faction was capable of overthrowing the other
two, and no two factions could bring themselves to work to overpower the
third. So there was equilibrium in place and this provided SFOR and the
international community significant leverage, enabling us to stay above the
fray, be even-handed, not take sides, and yet press for reforms. Although the
war had ended, make no mistake about it, there was still a battle of ideas under
way. SFOR's mission was difficult enough, but behind the veils of legitimacy
that confronted us in our formal public discussions lurked hard-line political
parties, corrupt politicians, police on the take, criminal gangs, black marke-
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teers, and extremist organizations, including paramilitaries and even Muslim
extremists who had infiltrated Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. Sorting our
way through this potential maze of deceit, we had to generate intelligence that
would help us retain the initiative.
We counseled our civilian counterparts in the international community that
SFOR's intention was not to use our military capabilities as a first choice, but
to use it sparingly and hopefully as a last option. That advice was, for the most
part, generally well received. We encouraged the IPTF (International Police
Task Force) to aggressively create a legitimate police force to which we could
turn over those policing actions. It is never good to have your military
component looking like the police force. Those functions needed to be turned
over, but despite its best efforts, IPTF found the going slow and arduous. In
the interim, SFOR had to balance being the option of last resort with
preserving its authority to go anywhere, do what it thought was important,
inspect anything it wanted, and take appropriate follow-up action through the
judicious use of force. There is a balance between both poles that must be
found. When force was used, we employed a cycle that had action, reaction,
and counteraction as its logical sequence. When you act, expect there will be
a reaction and be prepared to counteract that reaction. In other words, load the
third step, the counteraction, even as you are taking the first step because you
expect there will be a reaction. We always sought to have one more option
than our adversaries. To do so, we had to think through this process and have
sufficient force levels along with flexibility, agility, and responsiveness.
Strategic communications and information operations were also key. We
hosted anywhere from forty-five to sixty visits a month. These included heads
of state, ministers, and chiefs of defense from most of the forty-plus troop-
contributing nations and numerous congressional delegations. Foreign visitors
generally saw me as a NATO commander. Americans, on the other hand,
almost exclusively saw me as a U.S. commander. The responsibility of
coalition commanders is to make sure that those two perspectives remain
linked. Being consistent and treating other troop-contributing nations as you
do your own was essential to keeping this large, NATO-led coalition tightly
cohesive.
In 1999, as I assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff, we crafted a vision
that described the global environment in this way:
The world remains a dangerous place, full of authoritarian
regimes and criminal interests whose combined influence extends
the envelope of human suffering by creating haves and have-nots.
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These negative elements foster an environment for extremism
and the drive to acquire asymmetric capabilities and weapons of
mass destruction.
They also fuel an irrepressible human demand for freedom
and a greater sharing of the better life. The threats to peace and
stability are numerous, complex, oftentimes linked, and some-
times aggravated by natural disaster.'
Written on the eve of the twenty-first century, the world's best army was trying
to describe an environment it had been watching and wrestling with for most
of the decade. It was a global environment in which four bothersome factors
were evident to us: international crime, narco-trafficking, terrorism, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technologies, maybe not the
weapons but certainly the technologies. The four complicators, when you talk
about them individually, are policing functions. How would you deal with
them individually? With good intelligence and good police work. But
throughout the 1990s, we asked whether these four complicators could ever
merge into one problem. Our question was that if this kind of merger occurs,
who deals with the problem, because the resulting capability of that combina-
tion exceeds the capabilities of most police forces. It may exceed the military
capabilities of some of our allies. We were trying to describe our concerns.
Those who had spent time overseas sensed the danger in the environment.
Others who lacked that perspective may not have necessarily seen the great
envy and great anger at Americans for who we are, what we have, and how we
live. The Army's sense then, in 1999, was that we needed visionary leader-
ship, not hectoring, not lecturing, but visionary leadership. Winning this war
against the international terrorists would succeed, we thought, not because we
hunted down every extremist warrior but because we were able to better that
global environment we described in some measurable way. And to have any
hope of creating that kind of change, it would take strong, visionary, credible
leadership.
' Louis Caldera & Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, The Army Vision, SOLDIERS, Mar. 2000, at 4,5,
available at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/mar2OOO/pdfs/ArmyVision 1 .pdf.
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